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                                                                 ABSTRACT  
 
We provide an analysis of enforcement policies applicable to informal labor market in a 
framework with heterogeneous firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and 
politically dictated strategies. We argue that firms which operate both in the formal and 
informal sectors do very little to increase employment when faced with the opportunity of 
hiring workers in the informal labor market. Thus enforcement of labor laws and other 
regulations should not have aggregate employment effects. For firms operating 
exclusively in the informal sector, the outcome is different. Such features determine the 
stringency of enforcement in a market characterized by firms with varying levels of 
productivity. For example, for firms with relatively high levels of productivity, 
enforcement has to be stricter than in the case with relatively low productivity firms. 
Taxing the more efficient seems to be the optimal strategy.  
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Informal or unorganized labor markets absorb most of the workforce in the developing 
world. While workers employed in organized, i.e., the formal segment of the labor market 
are expected to enjoy trade union rights, and have claims on government recognized 
wage and other benefits, informal workers typically do not get such benefits. 
Consequently, they are exposed to day-to-day fluctuations of the labor market. A simple 
characterization of such segmented markets, that is generally accepted, runs in terms of 
the difference in wage rates. Formal sector workers normally enjoy higher wages than 
their informal counterpart.  
 Recent literature on informal labor market has focused on the impact of liberal economic 
policies on informal wage and employment. Marjit (2003), Goldberg and Pavnick (2003), 
Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) etc. have discussed the impact of trade policies on the 
size of the informal sector. In a different context Dasgupta and Marjit (2006), Marjit, 
Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) have analyzed the political reasons to promote and 
perpetuate the existence of “informal” labor market even if such markets undermine the 
legal jurisdictions. A poor country can choose to look away from the ‘informal’ sector 
because it provides “social security” for the poor and prevents political unrest. These 
views hold under the presumption that having an informal i.e. a low wage labor market 
helps “employment” situation and contain poverty. Kanbur (2009) elegantly summarizes 
the issue on enforcement of regulation in informal markets. In particular, emphasis is 
given on how the states decide on the limits of enforcement. This paper draws on these 
observations and provides a formal model of enforcement. Papers by Bajamin et.al 
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(2010), Estrin and Mickiewicz (2010) etc. elaborate the extent of compliance with  
regulations in different countries. One common observation in these analyses seems to be 
substantial evidence of lack of enforcement. 
 The purpose of this paper is to show, in terms of a simple framework, that existence of 
informal sector may not necessarily increase aggregate employment relative to a situation 
when there is no such sector. In other words, a change in the informal wage may not 
affect aggregate employment when firms employ both formal and informal workers. 
Employment effects of changes in informal wage will depend critically on the 
distribution of firms along the productivity spectrum. Degree of heterogeneity of firms 
matters in determining the aggregate effects of employment.1 From a political economy 
angle, our analysis has some new insights to offer. Since more productive firms will not 
increase their total demand for labor if faced with the opportunity to access informal 
labor market, political authorities in a democracy should be more inclined to enforce 
regulations in industries or markets where formal firms have large presence. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we develop the model and 
discuss the employment effects. The third section looks at the determination of informal 
wage. The fourth discusses policy aspect of the problem and the last section concludes. 
 
 
           
 
 
                                                 
1 Firm heterogeneity has played a key role in contemporary trade theoretic work. For an elegant survey 
refer to Helpman (2006) 
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2. Equilibrium in Segmented Labor Market  
 
Consider an economy with firms having a choice of hiring two kinds of labor; formal and 
informal at predetermined wage rates  > ,  being the wage paid to the formal 
workers and  is paid to the informal workers. Labor (L) is homogeneous and 
difference in wage rates is the only guiding factor differentiating the formal and informal 
sector. But the rule of law suggests that the firms are legally bound to pay  to each 
worker and they are liable to be punished if they do not.  should be interpreted as 






Firms are distributed in a continuum indexed by Z , [ ]1,0∈Z  
Production functions are given by 
F = )()( iLfZθ , i=1, 2                                                  (1) 
With 0)( >′ Zθ , θθ =)0( , θθ =)1(  and  
0>′f , , 0<′′f
  0)0( =f
Thus firms higher up in the ladder are more productive, i.e, greater compliance with labor 
regulations make formal firms more productive. 
Formal activities are conducted in a legal environment. Informal labor, if hired, will 
constitute extra legal activity. If audited and apprehended, such firms will have to pay a 
fine S. Firms hiring informal workers paying  are liable to be punished if apprehended. 2w
                                                 
2  will be held fixed in the major part of the analysis while  will be eventually determined with the 




The probability of audit is (0<q<1) and the penalty function is S with the following 
characterization: 
q
S = S  ,  , )( 2L ,0>′S 0>′′S
The complex penalty function can be easily substituted by a constant penalty and convex 
audit probability q with respect to the size of informal employment. The point is that, in 
the presence of q & S bigger firms find it increasingly difficult to operate in the informal 
sector.  
One can interpret S as perceived penalty due to loss of reputation if the issue of illegality 
is exposed in the media. Therefore, S is essentially a loss function, however it might be 
interpreted.3 
Hence, the profit function of the thZ  firm will be given by 













π     imply 
11 )()( wLfZ =′θ                                                                                          (4) 
)()()( 222 LSqwLfZ ′+=′θ                                                                         (5) 
For determining  equate (4) and (5): 21 , LL
)( 221 LSqww ′+=                                                                                        (6) 
Let 2
~L  solve (6) 
Or, = 2
~L ),,( 21 qwwφ                                                                                 (7) 
                                                 
3 For related discussion refer to Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) which explicitly relates S to a Nash-
Bargaining problem involving bribes and generates similar marginal cost of hiring informal workers. 
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(7) implies that for >L 2
~L  hiring informal workers will be more expensive on the margin. 
Therefore, if the firm decides to hire L number of workers and > , then will 
be hired from the formal sector. If  , informal workers will be cheaper to hire.  
L 2
~L )~( 2LL −
2
~LL ≤
Now, from (4) 
                    )),(( 11 wZL θφ=                                                             (8) 




L  as  
0>′θ  and   0<′′f
Let us solve for Z~  such that  
)),~((~ 12 wZL θφ=                                                                               (9) 
Z~  is the threshold productivity above which all firms hire formal workers along with 
informal workers. Those below hire only in the informal sector. 
From (8) and (9) following are immediate. 
Lemma 1: ZZ ~>∀ , [ ])~)( 21 LZL −  will be the extent of employment in the formal 
sector. 
Proof: , 21




L , ZZ ~>∀  
Therefore, 122 )( wLSqw >′+                  (QED) 
Lemma 2: ZZ ~≤∀ , firms will not operate in the formal sector. 
Proof: ZZ ~≤∀ ,  122 )( wLSqw <′+
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So far we have been silent on the distribution of firms. Let us assume that )(Zη  




From Lemmas 1 and 2,  
aggregate employment is given by,  


















Relatively productive firms [ ]ZZ ~≥  hire both formal and informal workers. Firms 
( )ZZ ~≤  with lower productivities hire only informal workers. Rauch (1991) gets similar 
separation results on a different model with varying firm size.   






Proof: Note that, depends only on , and q [from (7)].Here we are considering a 
situation where all firms are distributed above the threshold productivity
2
~L 21ww
Z~ . From Lemma 






dZZLLE η  





which is independent of . (QED)  2w
Following observations are in order.  
First, Proposition 1 implies whatever be the change in the informal wage, aggregate 
employment of relatively productive firms will not change as long as they use both 
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formal and informal workers. They just substitute one type of employment with the other 
as  changes. 2w
Second, composition of employment will change as  does respond to .  2
~L 2w
Employment in the formal sector is given by  







It is straightforward to argue that a fall in will reduce employment in the formal sector 
by increasing
2w
Z~ .  
Fig -1 describes the firm level equilibrium. 
 
)( 22 Lsqw ′+
 
−2OL  Informal employment in a firm operating only in the informal sector 
−− 21









3. Determination of Informal wage 
Suppose aggregate labor force is given by L . People look for jobs in the informal sector 
if they do not find one in the formal sector, with .21 ww >
3 Therefore, effective supply of 
labor in the informal sector is given by  
F
S
I LLL −=                                                                           (12) 
Recall that Z~  is defined by 
12 )

























F ηηη ∫ +−−=  
Also 21































η                                                         (15) 
If the informal wage goes up, firms switch to formal employment and more firms initially 
hiring only informal workers start hiring both formal and informal workers. Thus, total 
employment in the formal sector goes up. The residual number of jobseekers in the 
                                                 
3  is assumed to be given through negotiations with the trade unions, a feature of the organized labor 
market. Endogenous  must be lower than , otherwise everyone will go for informal job. While there 
is no explicit mechanism by which  adjusts under such circumstances, we assume away such 
possibilities for focusing on our main interest. In the literature Agenor and Montiel (1996), Marjit (2003) 
and others have worked with such models. One can explicitly solve for  by constructing the union’s 
objective function to ensure  > . One may also refer to Carruth and Oswald (1984) in this context. 









formal sector goes down. In other words, the labor supply function has a negative relation 
with . 2w
Let 2~w  be defined such that  
2222
~)~( LwLL ==                                                                         (16) 
0=FL  
Hence for 22 ~ww ≤ ,  0=FL
In this case LLsI =  
Suppose  then all firms will hire formal workers and formal sector employment 
will hit the maximum level say
12 ww ≥
FL . 
We assume  
                FLL >                                                                          (17) 
(17) suggest that even the maximum level of formal sector employment will not be able 








Aggregate demand for informal labor will decline as  moves up. Let us denote the 





IL =0 for . 12 ww ≥
This is obvious from (6).  
It is also straightforward to argue that  will continue to increase with decline in 




Lim LwLDI >)( 2                                                                                                 (18) 
02 →w  
(18) guarantees that for a low enough aggregate informal employment can exhaust the 








FLL − L 
        Fig-2 
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Given the nature of demand and supply function, we can infer the following. Let be 
the equilibrium wage.  
∗
2w
Proposition 2: Two possible equilibria will emerge either 221 ~www >>
∗  or 22 ~ww ≤
∗ . 
Proof: First, note that equilibrium always exists.  
Given (18) holds such  such∗∃ 2w LwL
D
I =
∗ )( 2 . 
Also   )()( 212
∗∗ ≤≥ wLwwL SI
D
I































As figure3 suggests both A and B are stable equilibrium. From the definition of 2~w
2w
2w
, at A  
there will be some employment in the formal sector. At B, there will be no formal sector 
employment. Also note that both A and B are Walrasian stable equilibrium. As goes 
down at A, better firms will increase demand for informal labor and so does the worse 
firms operating only in the informal sector. As better firms increase demand for labor, 
they retrench formal workers who then join the informal sector. So, the net employment 
effect for then formal firms is zero. The residual left is the increase in demand by the 
informal firms. So  responds to a greater extent than . Thus, the excess demand 
increases with a drop in and stability is guaranteed. Finally when  is edogeneous, a 
rise in  must rise (see the appendix) cutting back the increase in employment in the 
formal sector. Thus raising the supply  more than in the case with exogeneous . 
Similarly demand for  falls further as  also increases following a rise in . Both 
these effects will reduce  relative to  when  is edogeneous. Such edogeneity 


















4. Policy Issues  
In this section we are going to discuss two specific policies: one discussed in the public 
forum and other never discussed in the public perhaps owing to profound political 
implications it carries.  
a) Labor Market Reform  
If hiring and firing is costly, if exiting from an industry is difficult, it may hurt 
employment in the formal sector. These justify labor market reform policies prescribed 
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for the developing countries. However, such policies are undertaken with respect to the 
formal sector. If one reduces effective wage cost in the formal sector, it will have some 
impact on the informal wage, an indicator of the purchasing power of millions of the poor 
people. In the set up developed so far, changes in will affect both demand and supply 
in the informal sector.  
1w
Consider an initial equilibrium .To show what happens to  subsequent to a change 










Let us look at the impact on the supply side first.  
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dL ηη                                                   (20) 
If  goes up, formal sector employment shrinks leading to a rise in informal labor 















~)()( ηη  
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EDd I  where . SI
D
I LLED −≡1
Proposition 3: Since informal labor market is Walrasian stable, labor market 
reform will improve informal wage.  
Proof: A decline in hiring and firing cost of the organized sector labor i.e.  will 






EDd I  (from (22)) 




Hence must rise.           (QED)  ∗2w
b) Political Economy of Informal Sector  
As we have already discussed the informal labor market provides employment to a vast 
pool of workers who do not find jobs in the so called organized formal sector. In many 
ways this acts as a cushion for poor people in the developing countries. But the activities 
which employ informal workers tend to be outside the domain of legal boundary. These 
transactions are often unrecorded, unregistered and overall extra legal.  
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If the state has to preserve the sanctity of legal institutions and rules of law, strictly 
speaking, it becomes difficult to ignore informality completely and wish away extra legal 
activities. On the other hand, poor countries have to care for employment and income 
earning capacity of the huge unskilled population.  
In our framework,  represents an index of the monitoring intensity or stringency of the 
legal structure in place. Higher affects informal wage by restricting demand. If the 
government cares about aggregate employment as well as the importance of the legal 
institution, one may propose the following object function of the state. 
q
q
)(),( qCEq −Ω=Ω                                                                                (23) 
With    ,01 >Ω ,02 >Ω ,011 <Ω 022 <Ω , 02112 =Ω=Ω , 0>′C , 0>′′C  
where denotes cost of preserving law or rules of law and regulatory framework.  )(qC
Note that the objective of the government is related to those one used in Marjit, Kolmar 
and Mukherjee (2006). But in the latter the explicit role and working of the informal 
labor market was not introduced.In Marcoullier and Young (1995) a Leviathan State 
allowed informal activities or corruption to sustain itself for material gains. But ours is 
drawn from a more welfarist perspective.  
Aggregate employment E is defined as  











~)(()(~)()( ηηη  









One way to classify societies is to do it according to the distribution of firms. 































)~()~( ηηηη    
                                                                                                                                  (25)                                    


















From (26) let us define an implicit function 
0),( <′= EqEE                                                                                                      (27) 
Therefore from (22) and (26) we get  





              EC ′Ω−′=Ω⇒ 21                                                                                   (29) 
Note that the LHS represents the marginal benefit from upholding the sanctity of legal 
institutions, rules of law, punishing the illegal and extra legal etc. Right hand side 
represents the direct cost of monitoring and the indirect cost in terms of a reduction in 
employment in the informal sector.  
Let solve∗q )29( .4 
Economies may be classified in terms of quality of firms those operate in the economy. 
Think of a situation where all firms operate in the formal sector with and ZZZ ~0)( <∀=η
                                                 
4 SOC is satisfied provided EEC ′′Ω>′′Ω+′′−Ω 2211  
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0)( >Zη for ZZ ~≥ .We know that 0=′E in that situation. This will imply a higher 
compared to where there are firms operating only in the informal sector. Since more 
productive firms do not change their level of employment following changes in q , they 
just substitute informal by formal, the government should not have the incentive to 
protect the extra legal sector because the marginal cost of implementing higher levels of 
 is relatively low, on the other hand for firms who are operating only in the informal 
sector, this is an additional cost. It lowers the level of employment.  
∗q
q
Firms which operate in formal as well as in the informal sector tend to substitute one type 
of employment with the other. If q goes up, they will substitute informal employment 
with formal employment and that helps good governance. It discourages informal 
activities without much of an impact on aggregate employment. Thus, if either through a 
growth in labor productivity or through any set of factors that shift the labor demand 
curve upward, the need for pampering informal sector gradually declines. It follows that 
since the employment effect of bad governance is not so significant developed countries 
do not need to be protective about the informal segment.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The paper describes the process of employment generation in the formal and informal 
segments of a typical industry. Firms face higher cost of hiring formal workers relative to 
informal workers. Given the heterogeneity of firms in terms of productivities, 
enforcement of minimum wage law is bound to have different employment effects acm 
various firms. One major result is that firms which operate in the formal as well as in the 
informal sector, do not contribute to total employment faced with a lower informal wage. 
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Those exclusively engaged in the informal sector respond appropriately as the informal 
wage changes. This provides the foundation to a policy which suggests that more 
stringent enforcement of labor laws with respect to more productive, bigger firms is a 
politically sustainable policy in a developing economy. Since developed countries have 
far greater share of firms engaged in the formal sector, it is logical for them to strongly 
enforce minimum wage law. Thus our paper provides a themetical analysis of limits of 
enforcement. 
At a theoretical level we could endogeneize informal wage and argue why informal labor 
market will be inherently Walrasian Stable even if the labor supply responds negatively 
to informal wage. Such apparatus is potentially amenable to many comparative static 
results. Further extensions can be done in terms of bringing in skill differentials within 














 Determination of  1w
The trade union maximizes the sum of income (u) from formal sector and also the income 
the union members receive as informal workers when they do not find a job in the formal 
sector. 
Therefore, 
)(21 FF LLwLwu −+= λ                                                                           (1A) 





























L  and for a meaningful 1,1 ∈>w  
Thus  21 ww >
Therefore, )( 21 ww φ= , 0>′φ                                                          (2B) 
 
We have already derived in the text that  
 
)( 12 ww φ= , 0<′φ                                                                            (2C) 
 












Agenor, P.R.,& Montiel, P.J (1996), Development Macroeconomics, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press 
 
Benjamin, N. et al. (2010), Informality, productivity, and enforcement in West Africa: A 
firm level analysis, IPC (International Policy Center) Working Paper Series Number 
100. 
 
Dasgupta, I. and S. Marjit (2006), Evasive reform: Informalization in a liberalized 
economy with wage-setting unions, in Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis abd Ravi Kanbur (Eds.), 
Informal Labour Markets and Development. NY: Palgrave-McMillan. pp. 50-70. 
 
Estrin, S. and Mckiewicz, T. (2010), Shadow Economy and Entrepreneurial Entry, IZA 
(The Institute for the study of labor) Discussion Paper Number 5053. 
 
Goldberg, P. and N. Pavcnik (2003), The Response of the Informal Sector to Trade 
Liberalization, M.A: NBER working paper No.9443 
 
Helpman, Elhanan (2006), Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 44 (3), pp 589-630. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi (2009), Conceptualizing informality: Regulation & Enforcement, India 
Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 52 (1), pp 33-42. 
 21
Marcoullier D and L. Young (1995), The black hole of graft: predatory state and the 
informal economy – American economic Review, Vol. 85 (3), pp 630-646. 
 
Marjit S., S. Ghosh and A.K. Biswas (2007), Informality, Corruption and Trade Reform, 
European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, pp 777-789. 
 
Marjit S., S. Kar and H. Beladi (2007), Trade Reform and Informal Wages, Review of 
Development Economics, Vol. 11 (2), pp 313-320. 
 
Marjit S., V. Mukhrejee and M. Kolmar (2006), Poverty, taxation and governance, The 
Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Vol. 15 (3), pp 325-333.  
 
Marjit S. (2003), Economic reform and Informal wage – A General Equilibrium 
Analysis, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 72 (1), and pp 371-378.  
 
Rauch, J.E. (1991), Modelling the Informal Sector Formally, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 35 (1), pp 33-47. 
 
 22
